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Abstract
The co-decision procedure has had significant implications for the interaction between the EU institutions and has 
attracted the attention of a series of formal, rational choice institutionalists. However, these have mostly dealt with the 
Commission in a relatively superficial way and their conclusions about its legislative role have been rather pessimistic. 
Instead this study examines the role of the Commission in more detail by looking closer at both the formal and 
informal ways in which the Commission has affected legislation in co-decision from Maastricht to one year after the 
entering into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. The study includes interview and quantitative data at a general level as 
well as from three Socrates procedures completed in 1995, 1998, and 2000. In line with the formal, rational choice 
theorists, the paper notes that the Commission’s room for manoeuvre is significantly reduced in co-decision, but it 
argues that its relative loss of power with the introduction of the procedure should not blur the picture that in absolute 
terms it is still an important actor in the day-to-day decision-making of the EU. 
Kurzfassung
Das Mitentscheidungsverfahren hatte bemerkenswerte Auswirkungen auf das Zusammenspiel zwischen den EU-
Organen und hat die Aufmerksamkeit einer Reihe von formalen, Rational-Choice-orientierten Institutionalisten 
erweckt. Diese haben sich jedoch mit der Kommission zumeist nur in relativ oberflächlicher Weise auseinandergesetzt 
und deren Schlussfolgerungen über die politische Rolle der Kommission waren eher pessimistisch. Im Gegensatz dazu 
untersucht diese Arbeit die Kommissionsrolle im Detail, indem sie sowohl auf die formellen als auch die informellen 
Wege näher schaut, auf denen die Kommission die Gesetzgebung im Mitentscheidungsverfahren beeinflusst. Der 
Untersuchungszeitraum ist vom Inkrafttreten des Maastrichter Vertrages bis ein Jahr nach Inkrafttreten des 
Amsterdamer Vertrages. Die Studie basiert auf Interviews und quantitativen Daten auf allgemeiner Ebene als auch auf 
den spezifischen Daten von drei Verfahren zum Socrates-Programm, die in den Jahren 1995, 1998 und 2000 
abgeschlossen wurden. Im Einklang mit den formalen, Rational-Choice-orientierten Theoretikern wird hier festgestellt, 
dass der Bewegungsspielraum der Kommission im Mitentscheidungsverfahren signifikant kleiner ist. Allerdings sollte 
ihr relativer Machtverlust aufgrund der Einführung des neuen Verfahrens nicht den Blick darauf verstellen, dass sie 
absolut gesehen noch immer ein wesentlicher Akteur im täglichen Entscheidungsprozess der EU ist.
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1. Introduction   
The co-decision procedure introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 marked a fundamental change in the 
legislative balance between the European institutions. Most noticeably, it increased the involvement of the European 
Parliament (Parliament) in EU legislation, but also had the consequence that the Commission was put in a situation of 
structural disadvantage compared to previous legislative procedures. Hence, the Treaty, which sets out the structure of 
the day-to-day decision-making, gives the Commission less formal power to influence the position of the final decision-
makers in this procedure, i.e. the Parliament and the Council of Ministers (Council). This is very similar to the 
conclusion drawn by several formal, rational choice institutionalists. As an example, Garrett finds that, "(t)he result of 
this institutional innovation (the conciliation committee) is that the Commission's preferences need not be taken into 
account because it is structurally unable to affect the decisions of the Parliament and the Council" and "(f)inally, under 
co-decision the Commission is effectively taken out of the game before the real bargaining over policy begins" (1995: 
303 and 305). Moreover Crombez states that the Amsterdam version of the co-decision procedure, "renders the 
Commission irrelevant" (2001: 101).  
This may partly explain why, with the exception of one unpublished study (Rasmussen, 2001), the existing literature has 
dealt with the role of the Commission relatively superficially and/or has tended to focus on the relationship between the 
Parliament and the Council(1). In spite of this, the aim of this paper is to look closer at the role of the Commission and 
examine the ways in which the Commission can continue to affect legislation in co-decision despite being put in a 
situation of structural disadvantage by the Treaty. We agree with the formal, rational choice institutionalists that the 
Commission’s room for manoeuvre is clearly reduced in co-decision, but we argue here that its relative loss of power 
over time with the introduction of the procedure should not blur the picture that in absolute terms it is still an important 
actor in the EU policy process.  
Hence, even though the models of these formal theorists have provided valuable insights by showing how changes in the 
institutional conditions – i.e. the formal day-to-day decision-making procedures – have had important consequences for 
the role played by the different EU bodies in politics over time, they are merely models. Thus, they are simplifications of 
the EU policy process building on certain assumptions and excluding other elements of the decision-making process, 
which can be more or less justified (Rasmussen, 2001). 
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As recommended by the formal theorists themselves the insights developed by these models should therefore not stand 
alone, but should rather be seen as a starting point – or a tool to make hypotheses – for further empirical testing 
(Steunenberg, 2000: 369-70)(2). Moreover, even though we agree with the formal theorists that the Treaty rules should 
be the starting point for understanding how actors behave, we are more inspired by what we here call softer, rational 
institutionalists who also pay attention to how these rules are applied, interpreted and moderated through the actual 
behaviour of actors with different capabilities in the decision-making process (Knight, 1992; North, 1990). Instead of 
making an institutional analysis similar to the models of the formal theorists of whether the Commission is in a more or 
less favourable position in the Treaty procedure, we therefore make an empirical analysis of the extent to which it 
actually manages to leave its mark on the final legislative results by using both formal and informal means.(2a)  
The paper is structured as follows: Firstly, we present our approach and introduce the co-decision procedure briefly. 
Secondly, we set up a more specific framework for measuring the legislative influence of the Commission. Thirdly, we 
perform the empirical analysis by looking at two parameters, i.e. A) The chances of success in co-decision without the 
Commission and B) The Commission’s impact on the tabling and adoption of amendments and compromise texts 
throughout the procedure. Finally, we conclude and discuss the ability of different theoretical frameworks to understand 
the role of the Commission in co-decision.  
2. Approach   
The empirical analysis of the Commission’s legislative influence covers the period from Maastricht to one year after the 
entering into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. The Commission is regarded as having legislative influence when it 
successfully manages to persuade the Council and the Parliament to adopt elements in the final legislative texts that are 
different from what they would have been without its participation. This does not necessarily imply that the Commission 
has to persuade the Council and the Parliament to change their preferences but that it must persuade them to select 
another final compromise within the range of their preferences than they would have done without its involvement. The 
analysis demonstrates that the Commission often has influence on the adopted amendments and compromises throughout 
the policy process through its ability to act as a strategic facilitator.  
We use different methodologies and data sources to generate these findings and increase the validity of our conclusions. 
Generally, we both approach our data from a qualitative and quantitative angle, since we combine statistical analysis 
with detailed text studies and evidence from 28 interviews carried out among representatives of the formal EU bodies in 
Brussels in June 2000(3).  
Table 1 
More specifically, we firstly use micro level evidence from three procedures of the Community action programme in the 
field of education: Socrates discussed in co-decision and completed in 1995, 1998, and 2000(4). Hence, we stress the 
need to make a detailed examination of the interactions of the EU bodies in different phases of specific cases to fully 
understand the dynamics of co-decision. The Socrates procedures are interesting because they reflect a case, which has 
been dealt with three times in the history of co-decision enabling us to make more controlled comparisons of the role of 
the Commission over time. Moreover, the Socrates cases cannot be regarded as a particularly easy for the Commission to 
influence compared to more technical policy areas where its high level of expertise in relation to the Parliament and the 
Council is typically a greater strategic advantage.  
However, no matter how carefully selected case studies may seem, it is always questionable to which extent findings 
from these can be generalized, and it is usually recommendable to combine results of these with other types of data. 
Secondly, we have therefore also examined general, official documents of co-decision and interviewed practitioners who 
have been involved in the overall co-ordination of co-decision from the three EU bodies and/or who have been involved 
in other specific co-decision files. Thirdly, we draw on macro level evidence from a data set for some of the first testing 
of the formal models produced by Tsebelis and his staff of the co-decision proposals concluded by 1998, to which the 
Parliament has made amendments in either the first and/or second reading(5). Because our explicit focus is on the 
Commission, we restrict ourselves to the 34 of the 79 files in the data set here, which have gone into conciliation(6). 
Hence, these files should be most difficult for the Commission to influence, since it no longer possesses any formal 
powers at this last stage of the procedure.  
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3. The co-decision procedure   
The initial version of co-decision set out in the Treaty of Maastricht was a highly complicated procedure compared to 
previous legislative procedures. It could include as much as four readings in the Parliament and two rounds of 
conciliation between the Parliament and the Council and it was originally applied for 15 Treaty articles. The procedure 
was simplified with the Amsterdam Treaty and extended to cover as many as 38 areas of legislation spread over 31 
Treaty articles meaning that co-decision today is the “normal legislative procedure” for the Parliament covering more 
than half of Community legislation (Corbett et al. 2000: 191; Commission 1999a: 2-3).  
The formal procedure begins when the Commission submits a proposal to the Parliament and the Council, who begin 
considering the proposal in their committees and working groups respectively. Upon recommendation of the responsible 
committee, the plenary of the Parliament adopts its first reading opinion typically in the form of a series of amendments 
to the Commission proposal. If the Council agrees with the amendments of the Parliament, it has become possible for it 
with the Amsterdam Treaty to adopt the proposal and the procedure stops (the so-called fast track procedure). However, 
usually the procedure moves on just as it always did in the Maastricht version of the procedure meaning that the 
Commission produces a modified proposal typically incorporating some of the amendments presented by Parliament. 
Thereafter, the Council adopts its so-called common position, which is the legislative basis for the rest of the procedure. 
After the Commission has commented, another reading starts in the Parliament and usually ends with the adoption of a 
number of second reading amendments to the common position. The Council can then decide either to adopt the 
amendments of the Parliament or to engage in conciliation with the Parliament to find a final compromise where the 
Commission acts as a mediator.  
At both first and second reading, the Council can include amendments of the Parliament by qualified majority, if these 
are supported by the Commission, but needs unanimity if not. Hence the Commission exerts something, which in 
Rasmussen (2001) we called a formal gate-keeping power in the first and second reading(7). It has, however, become 
more difficult for the Commission to use its gate-keeping power at the second reading in co-decision than it was in the 
co-operation procedure, where it produced a modified proposal at second reading instead of “just” delivering its 
comments to the parliamentary amendments. This means that whereas the Council needed unanimity to remove or 
modify amendments in the co-operation procedure, it now actively needs to find a qualified majority to support 
amendments supported by the Commission in co-decision. Moreover, if the procedure goes into conciliation, the 
Commission’s formal role is much weaker and it has no gate-keeping power since the Parliament and the Council can 
agree on a compromise to be sent to the final vote in the Council and the plenary of the Parliament irrespective of what 
the Commission thinks. Finally, the Commission’s traditional right to withdraw legislation at any point in the legislative 
procedure is not valid in this conciliation phase (Commission, 1999b: 14).  
4. A framework for measuring the Commission’s legislative influence 
in co-decision   
In order to find out exactly which role the Commission plays in practice, we lay down a framework for assessing the 
legislative influence of the Commission. The measuring of legislative influence has been heavily debated in the history 
of social science (Hall, 1992: 205-07). Two of the most commonly used ways of measuring legislative influence include 
the use of either reputational or behavioural indicators. The former refer to interviewing a range of participants in the 
given policy area about the influence of certain actors, whereas the latter refer to using quantitative data of the actor’s 
behaviour to measure their influence on a proposal, for example by calculating the percentage of successful amendments 
(Hall, 1992: 207-08).  
Reputational indicators make it possible to collect information about the influence of actors, which is often unrecorded, 
but typically do not capture the possible difference that may exist between an individual’s reputation of influence and 
that person’s actual influence. Moreover, they often produce general accounts of an actor’s influence and fail to 
distinguish between variation among an actor’s influence on individual files. On the other hand, the behavioural 
indicators do not enable a separation of the influence of an actor’s preferences from that person’s agreement with the 
preferences of others. In other words, it is questionable whether an individual can be said to exert influence when what 
he or she really wants is equal to the wishes of the other actors. Moreover, behavioural indicators cannot capture the 
effect of “implicit influence”, which means that an actor adjusts his/her behaviour to conform to the preferences of the 
other actors. This makes it impossible to judge whether the apparently successful behaviour of an actor is the result of 
that actor’s true preferences or merely an anticipation of what was expected of that person by other actors (Hall, 1992: 
207-08).  
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Being aware of the difficulty of measuring legislative influence, we here apply a mix of both behavioural and 
reputational indicators, as the weakness of some will be largely compensated for by the inclusion of others. Firstly, we 
use an essentially “reputational” indicator to evaluate the Commission’s legislative influence by asking the respondents 
what the chances of success were and what the final legislative text would have looked like without the participation of 
the Commission in the policy process. At the outset, this indicator might seem speculative, since the respondents are 
asked to make counterfactual propositions by judging something, which essentially has no objective answer. However, 
the question is important since it encourages the respondents to think back on the role played by the Commission 
throughout the procedure and judge its importance. In other words, we indirectly ask the respondents to estimate whether 
there is a relationship between the behaviour of the Commission throughout the procedure and the final legislative 
outcome.  
Secondly, we look more specifically at the different ways in which the Commission exerts legislative influence. Since 
the Commission is not one of the final decision-makers, we argue that it exerts influence when it succeeds in persuading 
the Council and the Parliament to take its viewpoints into account and adopt amendments and compromise texts different 
from what they would otherwise have done. Hence, we question the respondents about the extent to which the 
Commission has affected the drafting of compromise texts and parliamentary amendments, which were successful in the 
end. Moreover, we analyse quantitatively the extent to which the Commission’s opinion on an amendment has an effect 
on its adoption in the final text.  
5. The legislative influence of the Commission   
Having set out our framework for measuring the legislative influence of the Commission, we now turn to a presentation 
of the results of our quantitative and qualitative examination.  
5.1 Chances of success without the Commission  
Closely linked to our definition of influence, we start by addressing the hypothetical question what the chances of 
success and the legislative content of the proposals would be without the presence of the Commission in the policy 
processes after it has presented its original proposal. In fact, most of the respondents from Council, Parliament, and 
Commission do not exclude the possibility that the files, in which they have been involved, could have been concluded 
without the Commission.  
However, the respondents generally agree that often the compromises would have been harder to reach. Hence, an 
official of the Commission states that, “Sometimes the positions of the Council and the Parliament are so far apart that 
only the Commission can find common ground”. This is supported in the following comment from a member of 
Parliament (MEP) who notes that conciliation without the Commission, would be more a war of attrition”, and by a 
Council representatives who notes that, “I also think that it would be more difficult to reach a compromise, because the 
Commission, when it acts in the right way, is relied upon by other parties”. This was for example the case in Socrates II 
where the Commission’s involvement in the negotiations impacted on the willingness of the Council and the Parliament 
to come to a final agreement. A Council official explains how “on a request from the Council and the Parliament, the 
Commission presented a document about the budgetary needs…with this document it was considerably easier to agree 
on a budgetary increase on the Council side, and for the EP it became easier to relax its demands. Therefore, the 
Commission played an extremely important role”. Other respondents note that the deadlines in the co-decision procedure 
could probably not have been kept without the involvement of the Commission.  
Moreover, a number of the respondents think that the compromises in co-decision would have been different, had the 
Commission not been involved. In this way, it is recognised that an important side effect of the Commission’s task to 
reconcile the positions of the other parties is that it is given the opportunity to influence the substance of the final text. As 
an example, a Commission official comments on the procedures for selecting projects in Socrates II and notes that: 
“I think that there, the compromise found between the two institutions would have been different, had the 
Commission not been there..they would have taken the Council’s position more into consideration, which 
would have made the selection procedures more complex, longer, and less user-friendly”.  
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It is, however, important to point out that the importance of the Commission to the successful completion of the files and 
its ability to influence the contents of the files seem to have declined over the years. Hence, the development of informal 
practices and interactions between the key players throughout the procedure has not always been beneficial to the 
Commission, who used to have a privileged position since the Parliament and the Council had very few direct contacts 
and were somewhat sceptical to engage in direct dialogue between each other in the beginning. However, over the years 
the relationship between the Council and the Parliament has loosened up, and increased informal contacts between them 
have developed. As noted by an EP official, I think clearly one of the impacts of co-decision has been to throw the 
Parliament and the Council together on a much wider scale that never happened in the past”. This is underlined by a 
Commission official who was involved in the negotiations of all Socrates files, “At that first stage (Socrates I) it went 
really through us and I would say uniquely through us… Afterwards (Socrates II) when they found each other and 
realised that they could do things directly between them, they did not see the Commission as so strong”. Therefore, there 
are occasions where the Parliament and Council have got together to negotiate files informally without the presence of 
the Commission(8). Generally speaking it is therefore likely that there will be variation in the influence of the 
Commission between individual cases, and the Commission’s advantage of acting as “the messenger” and link between 
the Parliament and the Council has come under increased pressure over the years.  
However, in the period studied, it was the norm that the Commission participated in the informal negotiations about the 
legislative files between Council and Parliament, which has provided it the possibility of influencing the files. Moreover, 
the Commission has the advantage of being the single body which participates in both the internal deliberations of the 
Council and the Parliament, which gives it a unique information advantage in the legislative process and a possibility to 
promote its viewpoints to the two other bodies separately.  
5.2 The Commission's impact on the tabling and adoption of amendments and compromise 
texts   
After having examined what the situation might have looked like without the participation of the Commission, this 
section considers the influence of the Commission in more detail by looking at some of the means by which the 
Commission can influence the final text. Thus, the Commission’s impact on the tabling and adoption of amendments and 
compromise texts is examined.  
The tabling of parliamentary amendments  
As mentioned, the Treaty gives the Parliament a possibility to table amendments to the Commission’s proposal in its first 
reading and to the Council’s common position in its second reading. Despite the closer relationship between the Council 
and Parliament over the years, the respondents confirmed that often the Commission actively assists the Parliament in 
tabling these amendments. In the first reading, this can be an important way for the Commission to ensure that the 
substance of its initial proposal is not changed fundamentally. Moreover, Commission officials can sometimes have an 
interest in encouraging the Parliament to present amendments, which would be politically sensitive for the Commission 
itself to include in its initial proposal. One MEP notes: “..the Commission expects that the Parliament will help it to get 
more (than the original proposal). I don’t think that it is completely satisfied with its original proposal, which is a bit on 
the low side. That’s why the Commission expects the Parliament to intervene..”. This is confirmed by a Commission who 
notes, “Often we can use the parliamentarians to pass certain messages, because they have a right to say what they 
like..there is a very good co-operation”. Furthermore, several respondents explained how, in the second reading, the 
Parliament can also be a valuable partner for the Commission by tabling amendments, which reintroduce elements from 
the Commission’s original proposal, not included in the Council’s common position. As a parliamentary official noted, 
“Of course, the Commission unofficially proposes or draws the attention of the rapporteur (the responsible MEP for the 
file) to things, which are not in anymore”.  
It should, however, be noted that even though the Commission is superior in terms of expertise and specific knowledge 
of the proposal, the MEPs are not merely the Commission’s tools. Hence, of course the Parliament also drafts a lot of 
amendments against the wishes of the Commission, which is shown by the fact that the Commission accepted or largely 
accepted 43 and 53 per cent of the Parliament’s first reading and second reading amendments respectively in the 34 
analysed co-decision files. Thus, the MEPs do not automatically transfer the Commission’s wishes into amendments, but 
can often be very receptive towards its wishes. In addition, the MEPs will typically be more open towards the 
Commission when the two bodies share common concerns, which makes it difficult to evaluate the degree of 
Commission influence on the basis of this measure alone.  
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This general picture of the Commission’s impact on the tabling of reports and amendments is confirmed when we look 
specifically at the Socrates files. Here, respondents have explained how, in all the three files, the Commission officials 
were assisting the MEPs in drafting their reports and amendments. In Socrates II for example, a Commission official 
notes how, “the relationship between xx (the parliamentary rapporteur) and the DG (Directorate General of the 
Commission) was just optimal. It could not have been better, which meant the Parliament did very much rely on the 
expertise of the Commission in drafting the amendments”.  
In all the three Socrates files, the Parliament introduced second reading amendments to the budget, which were in line 
with or even more favourable than the Commission’s original proposal. Hence, the Parliament deleted the Council’s 
introduction of a figure into the legislative act in Socrates I arguing in line with the Commission that the budget should 
be decided through the annual budgetary procedure, whereas in both the mid-term review and in Socrates II it proposed 
to increase the budget of the common position. It is likely that the Commission has encouraged the Parliament to table 
these amendments. As noted by a Council official, “If the Parliament offers a lot of money, the Commission says that it 
is too much, but it is clear that the Commission appreciates this very much”. It should, however, be noted that the 
opinions of the Parliament and the Commission about the budget do not differ fundamentally, wherefore this does not 
necessarily signify that the Commission has exerted considerable legislative influence.  
Nevertheless, we have also found evidence that other issues of less concern to the Parliament were introduced by it in 
amendments. A Commission official explains how in Socrates II, “The Parliament certainly asked us to state the key 
issues that we would see as worthy to reintroduce into the debate. If the Parliament had not asked us we would have told 
them, so it does not really matter who picked up the phone first”. As an example, Parliament reintroduced the more 
federalist “European education area” from the proposal as the goal of the programme instead of the Council’s proposal 
for a “European area of co-operation in the field of education and training”. Several officials supported the view that this 
amendment was a clear priority by the Commission and not so much of the Parliament. One of the Council officials even 
noted that the “European area of co-operation” could be regarded as a “hobbyhorse” of the Commission. Moreover, the 
Parliament fought against the change of the selection procedures and proposed to delete the Commission’s obligation to 
consult the member states in cases of disagreement between it and the national agencies on a project. Again, it is likely 
that the Commission had an impact on the tabling of these amendments, which is reflected in the following comment by 
a Commission official, “Whether the Parliament would have been quite so keen on that one without us having suggested 
it, I am not sure, but certainly as soon as we had explained it, they were very keen”.  
On the whole, the Commission therefore does seem to have a certain impact on the behaviour of the Parliament when it 
tables amendments. However, this is not enough to claim that the Commission has exerted legislative influence as 
defined here. Hence, the Commission’s effect on the behaviour of the Parliament must also result in changes in the 
substance of the actual proposals. In other words, are the amendments inspired by the Commission adopted in the end?  
The adoption of key amendments   
At a general level, it is of course very difficult to test whether the amendments inspired by the Commission are adopted. 
A calculation on the basis of Tsebelis’ data shows that 25 and 42 per cent of the Parliament’s first and second reading 
amendments respectively were accepted or largely accepted by the Council in the 34 files(9). Nevertheless, we can only 
guess, how many of these were influenced by the Commission. From examining the key amendments of the Socrates 
files, it looks as if the answer is mixed.  
If one looks at the issue of the budget, the Commission succeeded in getting a higher figure than the Council declared 
itself willing to accept from the very beginning in all the files, even if it did not get exactly what it proposed initially. It is 
clear that this was to a large extent a result of the fact that the Commission and the Parliament had convergent 
preferences in this respect. At the same time, it was stated in section 5.1 that the presence of the Commission had a large 
impact on the Council and Parliament’s willingness to agree on a compromise on this issue. Instead, the amendments in 
Socrates I aiming at removing the budgetary figure and at changing the comitology procedure into an advisory 
committee were not successful from the point of view of the Commission. Thus, Socrates I did not get a purely advisory 
committee but a combined management and advisory committee as proposed by the Council and an explicit budget was 
set in the final legislative act(10). The other Commission inspired amendments in Socrates II also had a mixed history. 
For instance, the amendment on the overall goal of the programme was given up by the Parliament at the conciliation 
stage, which declared itself willing to change the wording from a “European areas of co-operation” to a “European 
dimension in education and training”. On the other hand, the amendment regarding the selection procedures was 
successful in the sense that the extra consultation of the member states was made conditional upon a specific request 
from these and that it would have a maximal duration of two weeks. 
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Generally, the analysis shows that the Commission does indeed try to exert legislative influence by affecting the tabling 
of the parliamentary amendments. It has, however, also demonstrated that such a strategy does not necessarily lead to a 
successful adoption of the Commission inspired amendments in the end. Nevertheless, on the whole the Parliament has 
become an important ally to the Commission in a number of legislative areas with the introduction of co-decision. Thus, 
the Commission has often been able to use the Parliament body to push forward its concerns to a much greater extent 
than in other legislative procedures where the Parliament’s opinion is merely advisory or where the Parliament does not 
have a final veto. This is recognised in the following statement by a Commission official about Socrates I, “it was 
difficult to get the budget, but it was a great thing that Parliament had a role to play for the first time”.  
The overall adoption of amendments   
Another way of measuring whether the Commission exerts legislative influence is to look at its impact on the overall 
adoption of the parliamentary amendments, which is done next. We have chosen to exclude first reading amendments to 
entries of the text, which have been changed again at second reading, since we merely look at the relationship between 
the Commission’s opinion on an amendment and its inclusion in the final text(11). Altogether, our analysis is therefore 
based on 1,155 first and second reading amendments from the 34 examined files. Table 2 presents a cross tabulation of 
the relationship between the Commission’s opinion on an amendment and its degree of adoption in the final text.  
It shows that an amendment is adopted or largely adopted in the final text in 12 per cent of the cases, in which the 
Commissions rejects an amendment, whereas it is rejected in 72 per cent of the cases. At the other extreme, the 
Commission’s recommendation to accept an amendment has resulted in the amendment being either adopted or largely 
adopted in as much as 61 per cent of the cases. Hence, the data reveal a high degree of convergence between the opinion 
of the Commission on an amendment and an amendment’s chance of getting adopted in the final text. However, they also 
show that it is easier for the Commission to convince the Council to reject than to accept an amendment, even though it 
is influential in both cases.  
Table 2 
As mentioned above, Tsebelis et al. (2001) and Kreppel (2002) have also made analyses of the data set themselves. 
These analyses cannot be compared accurately with the results here, since they also include files, which have not gone 
into conciliation. Moreover, both studies use regression analysis even though essentially differences in an amendment’s 
degree of adoption cannot be quantified precisely on an integral scale. Bearing this in mind, we have instead calculated 
the simpler ordinal correlation co-efficient tau b, which is 0.46. In other words, our analysis shows that the 
Commission’s opinion can be used in approximately half of the times in the 34 of the examined files to predict an 
amendment’s final degree of adoption. It is clear that such crude data do no take the importance of the amendments into 
account and that correlation does not necessarily mean causation. However, seen in combination with our qualitative 
examinations of the means by which the Commission participates in the policy process, we believe there is evidence to 
conclude that there is a fairly substantial relationship between the Commission’s involvement in the amending phase and 
the content of the final legislative results.  
As discussed initially, the relationship between the Commission’s opinion on an amendment and its degree of final 
adoption can probably partially be explained by the fact that the Commission does not make its decisions on the 
amendments in a vacuum but tries to anticipate the amendments’ chances of success later on. That was confirmed by 
several Commission officials and is reflected in the following statement by one, “(t)o a certain extent, the Commission 
also in accepting amendments or refusing them firstly has a view to what its original position was, but secondly also has 
to think in terms of what the final structure is going to be”.  
Another way to partially explain why the Council followed the Commission’s advice on the parliamentary amendments 
could be that the preferences of the two were convergent. However, we believe that the relationship between the 
Commission’s opinion on the amendments and their degree of adoption in the final text is so substantial that it cannot 
exclusively be seen as an example of anticipated reactions or coherent initial preferences. The respondents also 
confirmed that the Commission does indeed have an impact on which amendments are incorporated into the final text. 
Hence, a Commission official noted how, “(...c)ouncil does not even examine the amendments, which the Commission 
does not take up in its modified proposal. They even do not look at them”. Even though this may not always be the case, 
it is not very exceptional either. A Council official states, “(u)sually, we examine the amendments supported by the 
Commission, for example if there are 100 amendments and the 60 are supported by the Commission, it is useless to 
examine the others, but it happens sometimes that we do”(12).  
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The general relationship between the Commission’s opinion on an amendment and its chances of adoption is also 
confirmed if one looks at the Socrates files. Firstly, table 3 of Socrates I shows that in the vast majority of cases, in which 
the Commission rejects an amendment, the Council follows the same strategy. In addition, table 3 demonstrates that the 
Council adopted as much as 60 and 83 per cent of the first and second reading amendments respectively, which the 
Commission accepted.  
Table 3 
Secondly, table 4 shows that none of the amendments, which the Commission did not support, were accepted in the first 
and the second reading in the mid-term budgetary revision of Socrates. Moreover, the Council accepted all the 
substantial amendments, which the Commission supported in the first reading.  
Table 4 
Finally, table 5 of Socrates II also shows a clear relationship between the Commission’s opinion of an amendment and its 
final adoption. Hence, none of the amendments, which were rejected by the Commission, were included in the final text. 
Moreover, as much as 74 per cent and 77 per cent of the first and second reading amendments respectively, which the 
Commission supported, were incorporated into the final text.  
Table 5 
Thus, there seems to be a fairly substantial relationship between the Commission’s opinion on an amendment and its 
degree of adoption in the final text at a general level as well as in the three specific Socrates files. Even though part of 
this correlation may again be a result of anticipated reactions and/or coherent initial preferences, the quantitative analysis 
supported by the qualitative interviews has left evidence that the Commission’s opinion on an amendment does in fact 
seem to influence the Council’s willingness to incorporate it in the final text. Hence, a number of final legislative texts 
might have looked different if Parliament and Council had reconciled them on their own without the involvement of the 
Commission.  
The adoption of compromise texts   
Another way for the Commission to continue to exert influence on the substance of the final text is through the drafting 
of compromise texts. Even though the increased contacts between the Council and the Parliament over the years have put 
the Commission in a less beneficial position, a parliamentary official stated, “I don’t recall any conciliation where the 
Commission compromises were not a central part of the discussion”. The co-decision guide from the conciliation 
secretariat of the Parliament also states that, “the Commission is often invited to produce compromise texts to be 
discussed in the delegations or at the next trialogue meeting” (Parliament, 2000: 11)(13). This may explain why the 
Commission does not automatically try to avoid the conciliation phase. As stated by a Commission official, 
“...sometimes it is in the Commission’s interest to try and get closer to its proposal in a conciliation process. In fact, 
there are times when we say, well, it must go into conciliation because then we will get something out of it”.  
Even though the majority of the respondents confirmed that the Commission is often the author of the compromise text, 
they also stressed that very often they are not presented as such. A Council official explains in detail how this often 
works, “(b)efore the trialogues or the COREPER meetings, we often have informal meetings between the presidency, the 
Commission and the Secretariat General of the Council, where we work on compromise texts. Sometimes, these texts are 
entirely written by the Commission. However, they are presented as proposals from the presidency”. The reasons for 
doing so are political. Hence, it is typically easier to reach agreement on presidency than Commission compromises in 
the Council. Generally speaking, a parliamentary official notes how, “(t)he Commission is actually doing quite a lot of 
stuff, but it is not necessarily being given credit for it. It has to live with that. It is being seen as useful”. The Socrates 
files confirm that the Commission is very active in the drafting of the compromise texts. Hence, an official states how in 
Socrates II, “the Commission always co-operated with the Austrian presidency in order to modify the text. The 
Commission was always invited to drafting meetings when new texts were presented...basically it was the Commission 
redrafting its own text and the presidency accepting the redrafting of the Commission’s texts”.  
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On the whole, the Commission does therefore exert influence on the final text through the drafting of compromise texts 
in a number of cases even though there are examples of cases where the actual compromises have been settled directly 
between the parliamentary rapporteur of the proposal and the presidency of the Council. Moreover, compromise texts 
written by the Commission do not necessarily get fully incorporated into the final text, but should rather be seen as a 
starting point for the discussion between the parties. Finally, it should be remembered the even though Commission 
unquestionably writes the compromise texts with its initial proposal in mind, it also has to consider what it will be able to 
get through in the end. This may for example explain why the Commission also drafts presidency compromise texts in 
cases where the two do not have very convergent preferences, for example in Socrates II.  
6. The Commission’s role revised   
The empirical analysis performed here has demonstrated that the Commission should not be ignored in co-decision 
despite being put in a situation of structural disadvantage by the Treaty. Formal, rational choice institutionalists, who 
argue that it is “irrelevant” and that its “preferences need not be taken into account” as stated in the introduction, are 
therefore not right. Instead, it has been fruitful to contrast their theoretical conclusions with empirical evidence both at 
the aggregate and individual level.  
That being said, it is also clear that the Commission in no way controls the legislative process of co-decision. Thus, the 
analysis also showed that co-decision has in fact put the Commission in a situation of structural disadvantage compared 
to previous decision-making arrangements since the Treaty limits its room of manoeuvre considerably. This means that 
the Commission cannot be certain to persuade the Parliament and the Council to bring forward its viewpoints throughout 
the procedure or to adopt any type of proposal, which it puts forward. This is in accordance with the recent analysis on 
the data set by Tsebelis’ larger research group as well as Kreppel herself, which both show that the opinion of the 
Commission on amendment seems to matter less in the co-decision procedure than under the previous co-operation 
procedure (Tsebelis et al., 2001: 595-96; Kreppel, 2002: 805)(14). Moreover, it has been pointed out in our analysis that 
the Commission’s prominent position as the messenger and link between the Council and the Parliament has come under 
increasing pressure over the years as the two have started to co-operate closer.  
However, the respondents generally believed that often the compromises would have been harder to reach and would 
have looked different without the Commission. More specifically, it was indicated that the Commission has exerted 
legislative influence by strategically influencing the tabling and adoption of amendments and compromise texts 
throughout the legislative process in such a way that the same results could not have been expected without its 
participation. In other words, it is underlined that in absolute terms the Commission is still an important actor in the daily 
integration of the EU policy process, despite its relative loss of power with the introduction of co-decision. Moreover, we 
have gone a step further into examining the dynamics of the daily politics of co-decision by moving beyond theoretical 
accounts of the actors’ scope of action to more specific consideration of the ways in which one of the actors involved, i.e. 
the Commission, can influence the final legislative result.  
7. A softer institutional framework   
The results of this work stresses the need not just to base further research of co-decision on a theoretical understanding of 
the formal Treaty provisions, but to examine in more detail how these provisions are used, interpreted and moderated in 
practice. As noted, we believe therefore that so-called softer, rational institutionalist analyses can be a valuable 
complement to the formal studies discussed initially. Thus, even though both of them share the same assumptions about 
actor behaviour etc., their different analytical frameworks allow them to focus on different elements of the decision-
making context.  
Hence, soft, rational institutionalists typically pay attention to a wider range of institutions than the formal theorists by 
including the effects of informal institutions such as norms and standard operating procedures in their understanding of 
actor behaviour (Knight, 1992; North, 1990). In the case of co-decision, the actors are not merely influenced by the 
formal Treaty provisions in regard to co-decision, but also by less formalized institutions such as interinstitutional 
agreements between the decision-makers, informal practices etc. As an example, our analysis showed that it was 
typically the norm that the Commission participates in the formal and informal negotiations between the Council and the 
Parliament in the period studied, which has given it a possibility to affect these meetings. Moreover, it demonstrated how 
it is standard practice that the Commission as the only body participates in the internal proceedings of the Council and 
the Parliament, which often gives it an information advantage in the decision-making process. Thus, the informal 
arrangements may to a certain extent modify the effects of the formal Treaty provisions. 
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Moreover, contrary to the formal models of co-decision softer, rational institutionalists do not merely examine the actors 
as a product of their formal institutional powers, such as their voting power, but also take their possession of strategic 
resources into account (Knight, 1992: ch. 5). Thus, the institutions will not determine the behaviour of an actor but rather 
give it a certain room for manoeuvre within which it can use its resources strategically (Scharpf, 1997: 42; Knight, 1992: 
58-59). Here, it was shown how often the Parliament has relied on the expertise of the Commission in tabling 
amendments and so have both the Council and the Parliament in the drafting of compromise texts later in the procedure. 
This gives the Commission a possibility to persuade the two to adopt a result different from what they would otherwise 
have done.  
In conclusion, formalistic frameworks are less appropriate for making conclusions about the Commission in co-decision 
because the formal weakening of the Commission by the Treaty means that it has increasingly had to rely on informal 
sources of influence to strategically persuade the two final decision-makers to bring on board its concerns. Such informal 
ways of exerting influence are not captured by the existing formal models, which explains why their authors have 
reached different conclusions about the role of the Commission than the ones presented here.  
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Endnotes  
(*) The author would like to thank Ove Kaj Pedersen, Michael Shackleton, Una O'Dwyer, Ole Elgström, Derek Beach, 
Karina Pedersen, Morten Kelstrup and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier drafts. 
(1) Roughly speaking, the literature can be divided into studies that use formal modelling such as Crombez 1996, 1997, 
2000, and 2001, Steunenberg 1994, Garrett 1995, Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001a and 2001b, Tsebelis 
1997, Scully 1997a and 1997b, and Moser 1997 and qualitative studies such as Garman and Hilditch 1998, Shackleton, 
2000, Earnshaw and Judge 1996, Jacobs 1997, and Farrell and Heritier 2002a and 2002b. 
(2) Some of the first testing of the models have been carried out by the formal theorists themselves, most importantly the 
question of whether the Parliament has won or lost power with the introduction of co-decision (Tsebelis et al, 2001 and 
Kreppel, 2002). 
(2a) To be fair, it should be noted that a series of the formal, rational choice institutionalists are aware that the 
Commission may exert informal influence beyond the formal Treaty provisions. As an example, Tsebelis and Garrett 
state "(t)he remaining influence of the Commission over legislation is thus likely to rely more on informal channels - 
asymmetries of information, persuasion and deal-brokering – than on formal roles written into the various 
procedures" (2000: 26). Thus, the problem is not that the formal institutionalists are ignorant towards the fact that 
informal means of influence exist but that they often draw very clear conclusions about the role of an actor totally 
ignoring these, and that they have not made any attempts to study these elements of the EU decision-making context 
further, for example by incorporating them into their formal models. 
(3) The 28 interviewees included 4 administrators from the Secretariat General of the Commission involved in the co-
ordination of co-decision and relations to the other institutions, 7 desk officers from various DGs of the Commission, 
who had been involved in concrete co-decision files, 3 parliamentary co-ordinators from various DGs of the 
Commission, 2 members of Commission cabinets in charge of relations to the European Parliament, 5 members of the 
Parliament, 2 administrators from the European Parliament and 3 from the Council working with the conciliation 
procedure, as well as 2 deputy permanent representatives from the Member States.  
(4) COD/1994/0001, 1997/0103, and 1998/0195. 12 of the 28 interviewed have been involved in the negotiations of 
Socrates. 
(5) Some files that fit these criteria have been omitted when some crucial citation for one of the stages was missing from 
the sources available to the coders. 
(6) In fact, there were 36 files altogether, which have been in conciliation. However, one has been excluded from our 
analysis, as it did not include information about the Commission’s opinion on the parliamentary amendments and another 
because it was Socrates I, which will be dealt with separately. 
(7) There are a few exceptions to this rule, since there were always a few treaty articles (currently four and after Nice 
three) where co-decision was applied with unanimity. 
(8) Examples of cases in which the Commission has played a relatively minor role in the negotiations include Novel 
Foods (COD 00/426) and Postal Services (COD 95/221) adopted in January and November/December 1997 respectively.
(9) In the first reading there is a relatively high number of observations where the Council’s degree of adoption in the 
common position is coded ”unclear”. This means that the first reading figure should be treated cautiously.  
(10) Instead, the result of the dispute was the so-called “modus vivendi” agreement, which increased the Parliament’s 
general right of scrutiny in comitology moderately (OJ C 43, 20.02.95, p. 37), whereas the question of whether budgetary 
figures should be written into the legislative proposals was solved by another agreement on “Amounts deemed 
necessary” stating that multiannual programmes in co-decision like Socrates should include an amount, which serves as 
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(11) Hence, it would be wrong to use data showing that the Commission’s opinion on an amendment did not have an 
impact on whether the Council included it in its common position at the first reading stage, if the amendment supported 
by the Commission was reinstated at second reading by Parliament and actually included in the final legislative text after 
conciliation. Thus, parliamentary amendments in the first and second reading are usually not independent, primarily due 
to internal restrictions in the Parliament on the tabling of second reading amendments (Parliament’s Rules of procedure, 
15th edition, rule 80). This means that, with very few exceptions (approximately 5 per cent in the current data set), 
second reading amendments to text pieces, which Parliament has also tried to amend at first reading, are typically 
reintroductions of previous amendments (with or without modifications).  
(12) However, if the file goes into conciliation, the Council has to examine all the Parliament amendments, as these 
along with the common position serve as the reference point for the discussion in the conciliation committee (Article 251 
[4]). Before the Treaty of Amsterdam, a similar wording can be found in paragraph four of “The 1993 Inter-Institutionel 
Agreement on Arrangements for the Proceedings of the Conciliation Committee under Article 189b” (OJ C 329, 
06.12.93, p. 132). 
(13) In fact, it is even written into the joint declaration for the practical arrangements of co-decision that the Commission 
may draft compromise texts (OJ C 148, 28.05.99, p.1). Trialogue meetings are smaller meetings between the key players 
from the Parliament, the Council and the Commission to prepare the work of the actual conciliation committee. 
(14) More specifically, Tsebelis et al. show that the Commission’s behaviour predicts the overall fate of a parliamentary 
amendment 85 per cent of the time under the co-operation procedure, whereas this figure is reduced to 70 per cent of the 
time under co-decision (2001: 595-96). For the reasons stated in section 5.2 their figures on co-decision cannot be 
directly compared to our statistics.  
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Research design 
Analysis level / 
methodology Micro Macro 
Quantitative
  Statistical analysis of amendments
in three Socrates procedures    Statistical analysis of amendments 
from 34 co-decision files
Qualitative
z Interview data about 
three Socrates files  
z Text study of 
official Socrates documents  
z General interview data  
z Text study of 
general co-decision documents  
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The Commission’s opinion on an amendment and its degree of 
adoption 
 
Source: Calculated on the basis of data from George Tsebelis.  
Note: Number of missing values = 4. The categories “partially adopted” and “modified not as Parliament wanted” have 
been collapsed, as there were few cases in a number of their subcategories (cells).  
 
 
Seite 2 von 3 EIoP: Text 2003-010: Tables
24.10.2003 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2003-010t.htmTable III 
Amendments to Socrates I: 1995-99 
Source: Calculated on the basis of official documents  
Table IV 
Amendments to the mid-term budgetary revision of Socrates I  
Source: Calculated on the basis of official documents  
Table V 
Table 5. Amendments to Socrates II: 2000-06 
Source: Calculated on the basis of official documents  
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First reading Second reading
Number of EP 
 
amendments
The Commission The Council Number of EP 
 
amendments
The Commission The final text 
104 
accepts 48 
accepts 29
22 
accepts 18 
includes 15 
rejects 19 excludes 3 
rejects 56 
accepts 3
rejects 4 
includes 1 
rejects 53 excludes 3 
First reading Second reading 
Number of EP 
 
amendments
The Commission The Council Number of EP 
 
amendments
The Commission The final text 
6 
accepts 5 
accepts 5
1 
accepts 0 
includes 0 
rejects 0 excludes 0 
rejects 1 
accepts 0
rejects 1 
includes 0 
rejects 1 excludes 1 
First reading Second reading 
Number of EP 
 
amendments
The Commission The Council Number of EP 
 
amendments
The Commission The final text 
54
accepts 34 
accepts 25
14
accepts 13 
includes 10 
rejects 9 excludes 3 
rejects 20 
accepts 0
rejects 1 
includes 0 
rejects 20 excludes 1 
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